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Where are Our guns.



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WHERE ARE OUR GUNS?

SPEECH

OF

HON. AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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SPEECH

OF

HON. AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER.

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union had under consideration the bill (H. R. 20347) making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1916.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DENT] said one thing this morning that impressed me. He said that of all the people who are talking about unpreparedness for war not one tells us how to be prepared. Of course not, because there are eight different committees in the House and Senate that have jurisdiction of that question. How can they lay out an intelligent program? What I ask for is a commission appointed by the President and the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate to make those very recommendations as to preparedness which no sensible man would undertake to make in default of proper information.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND ASIATIC EXCLUSION.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the Monroe doctrine stands like a flaming sword notifying Europe that she will not be permitted to colonize South America or Mexico. Do you suppose that that flaming sword is going to be effective against impoverished nations teeming with population unless we have something substantial in the way of military power with which to back it up? You might just as well expect a hungry hyena to respect the defenselessness of an unprotected bone. Moreover, we have looked the proudest nation of Asia square in the eyes and we have said to those fighting Japanese, "We will have none of you here. We don't want you within our borders." The Japanese Government professes friendship for America, you say. True enough; but suppose that some fine day the people of Japan should wake up and say to their Government, "We demand from the people of the United States the same treatment which they give to other nations." The Japanese will never be so unreasonable, you think. Won't they? How do you know? In these days the wisest man can't look very far into the millstone of the future. After all, is it so very unreasonable from the Japanese point of view, I wonder?

We don't know whether or not the Japanese are going to demand the same treatment as other nations for their people who desire to come to this country. But suppose they do make the demand. What is our answer going to be? Shall we let them in as if they were Europeans? Shall we grant them naturalization? Never by my vote, I hope, nor will I arbitrate that question, either; nor will the American people arbitrate that question any more than they will arbitrate the Monroe doctrine.

Ask any Member from the Pacific coast whether he will vote to arbitrate the question of Mongolian exclusion. Just ask him and see what he says. As to this philosophy of an international government based on the brotherhood of man, that may come in the sweet by and by, when Californians have learned to intermarry with Chinese and Mississippians have begun to select negroes for their wives.

TWO GENTLEMEN OF VIRGINIA.

Three years ago this Committee on Military Affairs carried through the House of Representatives a bill reducing the Army of the United States; and there stands the gentleman who did it—the chairman of this committee. Fortunately the Senate did not pass that bill. I have not forgotten the gentleman's words; neither have I forgotten the words of a certain other gentleman from Virginia, who once upon a time spoke to another resolution of the same sort. Here is that other resolution:

Resolved, That the Military and Naval Establishments ought to be reduced.

Listen to what that other gentleman from Virginia said:

With respect to war, we have, thank God, in the Atlantic a fosse wide and deep enough to keep off any immediate danger to our territory. The belligerents know as well as we feel that war is out of the question.

A good many of you have been saying exactly that same thing which that other gentleman from Virginia said. Do you know who he was? He was John Randolph, and what I have just read you came from his utterances in this House on March 22, 1810.

Yet two years afterwards the War of 1812 broke out, the impassable fosse was crossed by a hostile army, and before the war was over the British soldiers had applied the torch to the very Chamber where Randolph made his mad appeal to the mad vanity of his countrymen. "We can lick all creation," "Everything ready for the drop of the hat," "Trained citizeury leaping to arms"—all the well-known jargon appears in the annals, including the familiar argument that foreign nations would wear each other out and would have no strength left to challenge us.

Great Britain—

Says the Revolutionary veteran, Potter, in opposing the militia bill on March 20, 1810—

Great Britain has no men to spare to send here to invade our territory; and if she had, she would know better than to do it. And if France was ever so much disposed to send an army into this country, it would be in vain. She could not send them.

ABSOLUTELY UNPREPARED, AS USUAL.

Dawson, of Virginia, on December 13, 1811, arose in his place in this House and solemnly uttered this ghastly folly:

I feel myself authorized to state that we have all the necessaries, all the implements, all the munitions necessary for a three years' close war against any force which any power can send to this continent.

Contrast that with Dolly Madison's account a little later of our rout at Bladensburg and the burning of the White House by Ross, the British general.

Alas—

She wrote—

I can descry only groups of military wandering in all directions, as if there was a lack of arms or of spirit to fight for their own fireside.

Make no mistake, there was nothing the matter with those Pennsylvania and Virginia and Maryland militiamen whom Mistress Dolly saw, except that they had not been trained for war.

Six weeks before war was declared John C. Calhoun on May 6, 1812, told Congress:

So far from being unprepared, sir, I believe that in four weeks from the time that a declaration of war is heard on our frontiers the whole of upper and a part of lower Canada will be in our possession.

History does not record that conquest of Canada; but it records the fact that 100 days after Calhoun spoke Detroit was in the hands of the British, mostly because less than 1,000 of the trained citizenry of Ohio and Michigan sprang to the standard of Gen. Hull. Thomas Jefferson, who had written to Duane that—

The acquisition of Canada so far as Quebec will be a mere matter of marching—

conveniently called this disaster “the detestable treason of Hull.”

WHY NOT SUMMON GEN. WOTHERSPOON?

Ten weeks ago Maj. Gen. W. W. Wotherspoon, until recently Chief of Staff of the United States Army, wrote a solemn warning to the Secretary of War in which he gave it as his opinion that the United States is short 405,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 11,210,752 rounds of artillery ammunition, and 1,982 field artillery pieces. Even with unlimited appropriations it must take several years to supply that deficiency. Gen. Wotherspoon's estimate is far higher than any ever before made in the United States; but it is founded on a knowledge of facts which the present European war has developed. Why has he not been summoned as a witness before the Military Committee, I make bold to ask? Twice publicly and once by letter I have asked Chairman HAY to summon Gen. Wotherspoon, and three times Chairman HAY has refused. In my opinion it is unmitigated folly to make up this Army bill without questioning the very witness whose testimony would be of the greatest value.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARDNER. Certainly.

Mr. McKELLAR. Is there any other military expert in the country who has ever agreed to any of the figures given by Gen. Wotherspoon in his report?

Mr. GARDNER. So far as I know, there is only one who has disagreed and that is Gen. Crozier.

THE MEN BEHIND THE GUNS.

Now, some gentleman this morning—I think it was the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DENT]—said that we did not need a standing army of even half a million, much less a million, men. That is the same man of straw which President Wilson set up. Who has said anything about the necessity of a large standing army? I should like to know. Gen. Wotherspoon based his estimates on a standing army of 205,000 men. Any statement to the contrary is simply the exaggeration of persons who seek to throw dust into the eyes of the public so as to obscure the issue. Gen. Wotherspoon estimated that at the outbreak of hostilities with a great nation we ought to have a foundation of 205,000 Regulars, the total available force to be 800,000 men.

His view is that we ought to have in this country about 600,000 trained militiamen or national guardsmen and reservists.

In other words, Gen. Wotherspoon feels that when war breaks out this country must be able to draw at once on 600,000 civilians who have had some military training. Adding this number of civilians to the 205,000 Regulars, we arrive at the general's estimate of an army of about 800,000 men.

Now, based on an army of 800,000 men in the early part of a war—that is, before new troops can be trained—800,000 men of more or less military experience, he estimates that an accumulation of certain kinds of munitions of war is imperatively necessary before war breaks out. On page 12 of his report as Chief of Staff United States Army, you will find Gen. Wotherspoon's figures showing what he thinks we ought to have, and likewise his figures showing what as a matter of fact we actually have got. I shall print a table prepared from his figures in connection with this speech.

RIFLE AMMUNITION.

For instance, he estimates that before war breaks out we ought to accumulate 646,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. Now, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY] in his table this morning gives 196,000,000 rounds only as the total amount of rifle ammunition which we need to accumulate. Chairman HAY's figures are Gen. Crozier's figures. They are his personal figures, but the other officers in the War Department do not agree with Gen. Crozier. Those are not the War Department figures, never have been the War Department figures, and if Gen. Crozier gave those figures to your chairman and let him believe that they were the War Department figures, he did very wrong.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, in justice to Gen. Crozier I desire to say that he has always stated that those were his figures, and that a great many Army officers did not agree with him.

Mr. GARDNER. Did he not go further than that?

Mr. HAY. He may have gone further.

Mr. GARDNER. If the gentleman will observe his own remarks this morning, he will find that he spoke of those as the War Department figures. However, the gentleman and I agree, and Gen. Crozier admits that those are not the War Department figures. I will tell you directly what the War Department figures are. I want to put this in the RECORD.

I think the committee ought to understand—

This is the statement of Gen. Crozier during the recent hearings—

that most officers think that what we have is not enough. I believe that there are other things that are so much more pressing that I do not feel uneasy about this class of military supplies.

That is the only defense for the figures in the table of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY]. The General Staff of the Army has reckoned that we need 513,430,640 rifle cartridges, not to mention some sixty million additional, if our coast-defense force is armed as Infantry. This estimate has been approved by the War Department. Gen. Wotherspoon places the figure at 646,000,000. How much have we actually got? On the 1st of July next we shall have in stock 241,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. The testimony of Gen. Crozier is that it would take the entire capacity of the country, public and pri-

vate, eight months to manufacture 200,000,000. In order to get the proper supply which the General Board believes that we ought to have when war begins we should have to wait pretty nearly a year after war had broken out.

FIELD ARTILLERY.

Now we come down to the next item, field guns. This chart which I exhibit here shows what we have. And, mind you, we have not one single one of those giant guns to our name. You have been reading about the 42-centimeter howitzers, you have been reading about the 315-millimeter guns, and about the 9-inch guns which Gen. French has. How many of those titanic cannon do you suppose we have? Not one single, solitary one. No movable artillery bigger than a 6-inch gun in our entire military establishment and only 32 of those 6-inch howitzers. We are experimenting in drafting plans for two different sizes of bigger guns. My friends, when you look through the hearings you find that we have been doing nothing but experimenting and drafting and estimating and reporting for many a year. This remark applies to submarines and air craft just as much as it does to giant field artillery. Imagine the United States being always in the experimental stage.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. I want to ask the gentleman about the quantity of rifle ammunition. How long does Gen. Wotherspoon estimate that the 646,000,000 rounds would last?

Mr. GARDNER. That is the accumulation necessary prior to the outbreak of the war. Now, as to how long it will last, that is a very difficult question to answer. If ammunition is fired at the rate it was fired at El Caney, it will last a long time. If it should be fired at the rate our troops fired in China, it will soon be exhausted. We have not very good estimates as to the length of time it would take to exhaust rifle ammunition.

Mr. HUMPHREYS of Mississippi. Have you any estimates at all?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Mr. HAY. Will the gentleman allow me to give him the information that we have accumulated as far as we can?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes.

Mr. HAY. The last great war was the Russo-Japanese. For the first six months of that war the Japanese fired 97 rounds per man, and the Russians fired 56 rounds per man. That information comes from a study of that war by the general staff of the British Army.

Mr. GARDNER. Of course Gen. Wotherspoon does not agree with the gentleman, and neither does the General Staff of the United States Army. In the attack on the Forbidden City in Peking a few years ago our troops emptied their belts in 40 minutes, which means that 100 rounds of rifle ammunition per man were fired away in less than three-quarters of an hour. On the other hand, at El Caney our troops in five hours only used up 16 rounds per man.

I am very glad that the gentleman has brought forward the Russo-Japanese War as a basis for comparison. I myself intend to instance that war for a like purpose in connection with my statements as to artillery and artillery ammunition.

Mr. TALCOTT of New York. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARDNER. Surely; but I have only a few minutes.

Mr. TALCOTT of New York. Is that the estimate of cartridges for 650,000 rifles?

Mr. GARDNER. That is the estimate for 642,541 rifles, according to the report of the Chief of Staff.

Mr. TALCOTT of New York. On the basis of an Army of 800,000 men?

Mr. GARDNER. Yes; 205,000 Regulars and the rest reserves and militia. I can not give you the exact figures, but I will put them in the RECORD.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARDNER. I have only 50 minutes, and I can not yield unless the gentleman has something upon this point.

Mr. HOWARD. I simply want to ask the gentleman how long will it take to fire 240,000,000 rounds?

Mr. GARDNER. I have just answered that question. I said it was impossible to judge; it depends upon whether we meet conditions of warfare where there is a great deal of infantry fire or not.

FIELD ARTILLERY.

Now I come to the Field Artillery. Here is what Gen. Wotherspoon estimates that we need; Two thousands eight hundred and thirty-four artillery pieces. We have on hand and in process of manufacture only 852 pieces of artillery. Gen. Wood testified before the fortifications committee last year that the entire capacity of this country, working night and day, is 500 guns in one year.

Gen. Wotherspoon has estimated that we must accumulate 2,834 guns before war breaks out, while the General Staff of the United States Army puts the figure at 1,292 guns. How does this difference arise? Why is it that the General Staff presents one estimate and the Chief of the General Staff quite another? The reason is that the General Staff made its estimate before the European war, and it calculated about three guns to every thousand men in the field army. The war has demonstrated that European armies count on about five guns to a thousand men. On that basis of five guns to every thousand men and on the basis of an army of 800,000 instead of an army of 500,000, the number of guns requisite is increased from 1,292 to 2,834. Russia, by the way, had 6,000 guns a year ago, Germany 5,000 guns, and France 4,800 guns.

Now let us see about the Russo-Japanese War, of which the chairman spoke. How many guns do you suppose Russia had at the Battle of Mukden on the firing line? Twelve hundred and four guns Russia had on the firing line in that one battle alone. How many guns do you suppose that Japan had at the Battle of Mukden? Nine hundred and ninety-two guns. Twice as many as we can turn out in the course of a year with the Government arsenals running full blast and every other private concern in the country running as well. All these figures can be found in the evidence of Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, former Chief of Staff, United States Army, on December 4, 1913, before the Military Affairs Committee, and December 9, 1913, before the fortifications committee.

ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.

We come now to the question of field-gun ammunition. Gen. Wotherspoon reports that we ought to accumulate 11,000,000 rounds. That seems a large amount. What is the reason for it? The General Staff before the European war estimated that we ought to accumulate 1,713,240 rounds. We have only got on hand and under manufacture 580,000 rounds. But why did Gen. Wotherspoon estimate our necessity at 11,000,000 rounds? Because of the reports from the European war. We are told that the Germans have as a reserve for each gun as many rounds as the gun will fire before becoming worthless. That amounts to about 5,000 rounds for each field gun. Very likely that is why Gen. Wotherspoon estimates 5,000 rounds for each gun instead of 1,800 rounds, which is the estimate made by the General Staff before the war. However, we should know his reasons more definitely if the committee had not refused to summon him.

Probably another reason why Gen. Wotherspoon raised his estimate to 5,000 rounds is that the report of one of our officers in Europe—Lieut. Hunsaker, I think—shows, so I am told, that a certain French battery whose operations he recently noted fired between 500 and 600 shots per gun for four days in succession. Yet the extreme output possible for the United States arsenals is only 1,800 rounds a day. At the rate of that French battery three or four guns could shoot away ammunition as fast as we could supply it.

But suppose we take Gen. Wood's old estimate before the European war of 200 rounds per day for each gun. Even then do you realize that eight guns could shoot away ammunition as fast as Uncle Sam could turn it out, working night and day? Five hundred and eighty thousand rounds for our Artillery ammunition supply! Why, Russia, in one battle alone, the Battle of Mukden, fired away 250,000 rounds—one-half of all that we have got in the whole country on hand and in the making. Yet orators say that we are prepared for war.

ARE WE BETTER PREPARED THAN EVER BEFORE?

Some of the gentlemen who oppose any expenditure of money on preparations for our national defense console themselves by the comforting thought that we are better prepared than ever before in our history. Better armed? Perhaps. More secure? Certainly not.

It may be true—in fact, it is true—that we have more reserve artillery, more reserve rifles, and more reserve ammunition than formerly; but how does that fact alone dispose of the question of our security?

Our reserves in material of war may be quite sufficient if we never pick a quarrel with any enemy more dangerous than Huerta and if we never fight a battle more bloody than the Battle of Vera Cruz in the Second Mexican War. But suppose we should meet a real enemy. The other great nations have been striding forward by furlongs, while we have been crawling along by inches, so far as military progress is concerned. Do you think that the modest increase in our reserve war material justifies the assertion that we are better prepared than ever before?

When he armed himself with a sharp umbrella Tweedledee was satisfied that he was fitter to fight than at any time of his life. So he was, for up to that time he had used his bare fists, and now he had an umbrella; but meanwhile Tweedledum had gotten himself a sword. "There's only one sword, you know," Tweedledum said to his brother; "but you can have the umbrella; it's quite as sharp." Fortunately for Tweedledee the monstrous crow prevented the battle.

AIR CRAFT.

After all, I am not so sure that we are better armed than we used to be. If a man is going blind, he is not better armed just because he gets a more accurate rifle. That is just what is happening to our Army. It is going blind. It has no eyes with which to see the enemy. "In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with any foe possessing a proper air service, our scouting would be blind." So says the General Board of the Navy, and that observation applies to the Army just as much.

Capt. Bristol, head of the air service of the Navy, has compiled some mighty interesting figures which he gave us in his testimony. On July 1, 1914, it appears that France had 1,400 aeroplanes and 22 dirigibles; Russia had 800 aeroplanes and 18 dirigibles, and the other great nations followed suit.

Since the aeroplane was an American invention, perhaps you think that we lead the world in aeroplanes. Well, we do not. We have 11 of them in the Army and 12 in the Navy. None of them are armored. Not more than 2 are of the same type, so it is said.

As to dirigibles, we have not a single solitary specimen, either of the Zeppelin or of any other type. What is more, we are not likely to have any Zeppelins until the American people get upon their hind legs and holler so that the Government deaf-mutes can hear. Zeppelins cost money. Each Zeppelin costs pretty nearly a cool million of dollars, and there is a deal of pretty spending in a million of dollars. Waste it on a gas balloon, indeed! No, thank you; we will be our own gas balloons and we will save that money for increased pay where the votes grow thickest. This bill gives the Army air service the magnificent sum of \$300,000 this year. I hope that our airmen will feel duly grateful, but they can not buy half a Zeppelin with the whole of the money.

MORE SOLDIERS FOR THE TRENCHES.

When all is said and done, Mr. Chairman, we finally come down to certain facts: Ammunition and field guns are vital enough, but the first thing to be done is to get more men and a better organization. We do not need a big Regular Army, but we need a Regular Army a good deal bigger than we have now. Gen. Wotherspoon's estimate of 205,000 is worth examining.

I do not say that Gen. Wotherspoon is right in asking for 205,000 men. Very likely he is right, but what we need is a commission to examine into this whole question, a commission which will summon young officers and young enlisted men and say to them, "How long do you think it takes to make a good artilleryman? How long do you think it takes to make a good

infantryman?" That is what I want—to find out what the younger men think about things. We ought not to base our views entirely on what these graybeards think. It stands to reason that each one of them is pretty nearly bound to defend his own department. Take, for instance, Gen. Crozier. He has been for 13 years sitting in his chair as the head of the Bureau of Ordnance. I should like to find out what the younger officers of the Bureau of Ordnance think.

THE NAVY FIRST OF ALL.

Our first line of defense, of course, must be the Navy. That stands to reason. If I had \$200,000,000 extra to spend to-day on the Nation's defense, I should probably spend about \$160,000,000 of it on the Navy.

But the battle fleet may be defeated or it may be engaged in defending the Panama Canal at the very moment when a hostile base is being established 2,000 miles away—that is, supposing the enemy is England, because no other nation is strong enough on the ocean to divide its fleet. If once the enemy lands and establishes a base, nothing can stop him except long lines of infantrymen in trenches.

How long a battle front do you think that our entire field Army, Regulars and Militia, could cover? On the old Civil War basis of 5,000 men to the mile, our men, if all the militia were to turn up, could cover the paltry distance of 30 miles. We have in our militia—or National Guard, as it is called—120,000 men. Of this number last year 23,000 failed to present themselves for annual inspection. Thirty-one thousand absented themselves from the annual encampment, and 44,000 of those armed with rifles—and only 111,000 are armed with rifles—44,000 never appeared on the rifle range from one year's end to the other. Talk about drawing on the citizenry and their leaping to arms! Let me tell you, gentlemen, that 16 of the States of this Union failed to supply their quota of troops in the Spanish War. Some of them only failed by a few men, but 16 of the States of this Union did not supply the entire quota which they were called upon to supply.

Now, do not tell me that an army of 200,000 Regulars is undemocratic and is likely to oppress the people. That is all demagogic rubbish. Two hundred thousand men can not oppress a country of a hundred million population. That would mean that 1 soldier could terrorize 500 people. Why, it is folly to suggest such a thing, even if the rank and file of the United States Army were willing to go into the oppressing business, which would not be the case. If anyone thinks that 1 armed soldier can terrorize 500 Americans—men, women, and children—let him now speak or forever hereafter hold his peace.

THE DOCTRINE OF HUMILITY.

O you preachers of the doctrine of national humility, if any one of you for a moment thinks that the people of this country agree with you that we ought to be undefended, I should be glad to have you accompany me on my speaking tour in March and debate the question with me on the same platform. A few minutes observation of your audiences would convince you of your mistake. I know what I am talking about, for I

have already tried several experiments in that line. I am not eloquent. I have not even the sublime gift of the gab. Hitherto I have never been able to make an audience applaud me more than a small fraction of a small second. Hitherto I never in my life felt the glowing consciousness that an audience wanted me to continue. But on this question of the national defense I have got my audiences going as if I were William Jennings Bryan talking prohibition to a convention of patent medicine dealers. Never before in my life have I had applause as if my audience were paid a dollar a clap, and I confess I like the new sensation. So I just give fair warning that if any one of you pacifico Members of Congress wants to challenge me to a joint debate in the month of March before any audience—black, white, yellow, or pink—I am at your service, and you will not have to give me any gate receipts or honorarium or any other of the 57 different varieties of high-brow pickings, either.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

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