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Gardner, A. P.

Army & Navy Manual
for Debaters & Others.

1915



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ARMY AND NAVY MANUAL FOR DEBATERS AND
OTHERS.—FACTS SHOWN BY EXTRACTS FROM
THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.—I CHALLENGE
CONTRADICTION OF THESE FACTS.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 14, 1915



WASHINGTON
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EXTENSION OF REMARKS
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HON. AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER,
OF MASSACHUSETTS,
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Thursday, January 14, 1915.

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Speaker, we are the most prosperous Nation on earth, and to the south of us lies the wonderful South American Continent, which we have closed to European colonization by the Monroe doctrine. I simply can not understand how any intelligent student of history can fail to see that we are impotent to defend ourselves and to enforce the Monroe doctrine by moral suasion and financial might alone.

The state of our national defenses ought to be looked into and a comprehensive plan for the future prepared. This inquiry and report should be made by an independent commission, so that unprejudiced minds may be brought to bear on the question. The work can not be done by existing committees of the House and Senate, first, because eight separate committees of the two bodies have jurisdiction of different parts of our national-defense problem; second, because the older members of all those committees, especially in the House, must necessarily be prejudiced in favor of their own work done in the past.

OUR NEEDS.

The General Board of the Navy, of which Admiral Dewey is chairman, is the official adviser of the Navy Department.

For many years the General Board has reported that for purposes of defense against the strongest nation, *except Great Britain*, as a foundation of fighting ships we need 48 battleships, less than 20 years old, and 192 destroyers.

Instead of this we have built, building, or authorized only 37 battleships less than 20 years old, and 68 destroyers.

Admiral Badger, recently commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt have testified that we need 71,000 men to man only that part of our

present fleet which would be useful in time of war and to perform necessary shore duties. This estimate makes no allowance for the additional trained men required for signal and tactical work, etc., on board all the auxiliary vessels, which we must obtain in case of war, nor does it allow for the additional men needed to man the warships now under construction.

Instead of this we have only 52,500 men.

Admiral Badger and Admiral Vreeland testified that we need 100 submarines. (Admiral Vreeland testified that we needed that number for harbor defense alone.)

We have only 58 submarines built, building, or authorized, and many of them are absolutely obsolete and worthless.

We need an ample supply of aeroplanes and a few Zeppelins or other type of dirigibles.

We have only 23 aeroplanes (none of them armored) and not a single Zeppelin or other dirigible.

We need as big guns in our coast defenses as the modern foreign superdreadnaughts carry. The most powerful cannon in any fortification on the Atlantic coast are only 12-inch guns. Superdreadnaughts of the *Queen Elizabeth* type each carry eight 15-inch guns.

We need a large number of men in the Naval Militia and a large number of men in the Naval Reserves.

We have only 7,700 men in the Naval Militia, we have no Naval Reserve, and sailors in the merchant marine are not trained for the highly specialized duties of modern men-of-wars-men.

According to the estimate of the General Staff of the Army, prepared before the outbreak of the European war, we need a field army of 460,000 men, composed of regulars, militiamen, and reserves, ready to take the field at once at the outbreak of war.

According to the Secretary of War's annual report, we have only 29,405 regulars available for a field army, together with 119,087 militiamen if they all came to the front in time of war, and 16 men in the Army Reserve.

According to the last report of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, we need 11,790,850 rounds of artillery ammunition and 646,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition.

Instead of this, we have on hand and being manufactured only 580,098 rounds of artillery ammunition and 241,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition.

According to this same report we need 2,834 field and artillery guns. Instead of this we have on hand or being manufactured only 852 field artillery guns.

We need a supply of heavy field artillery such as the armies of Europe are using—9½-inch howitzers, 12½-inch howitzers, and perhaps even 16½-inch howitzers, like the gigantic German guns.

We have only thirty-two 6-inch howitzers and smaller pieces, but none larger.

THE NAVY.

[Extracts from testimony by Congressman GARDNER before the House Committee on Naval Affairs. From official printed report of committee.]

Out of 33 completed battleships do you know that 12 of them are unfitted for service without long delay? That is all on account of the refusal to pay the bill for manning them properly. We have 33 battleships, and 12 of them are in cold storage, where we can not get them when we want them. (P. 1060.)

Do you know that if we had gone to war with the rest of the civilized world at the beginning of last August that nine of our battleships would not be ready to fight yet? We have three battleships in reserve, six in ordinary, and three out of commission. That is to say, we have three battleships that need to be put in training, we have six of what Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt calls the graybeards of the fleet, and we have three in their second childhood. That is the situation in regard to the battleships, and he tells us that to put the vessels in "reserve" into fighting trim takes three months, and that to put the six battleships that are in "ordinary" into fighting trim will take six months, and that would mean the 1st of February, if we had gone to war with the rest of the powers. (P. 1060.) (Reference: Hearings, Roosevelt testimony, pp. 939, 940, 942.)

Now, in company with those battleships, to keep them company in cold storage, let us see what we have. We have 15 cruisers, 22 destroyers, 18 torpedo boats, 12 submarines, and perhaps a dozen miscellaneous fighting ships kept in cold storage with the battleships. In other words, we have 80 or more fighting vessels of our modest Navy not fit for battle in case of an emergency. (P. 1061.) (Reference, Asst. Sec. of Navy Roosevelt press memo., Oct. 21, 1914.)

We have had testimony here before this committee that it would take five years to get a reserve of 25,000 sailors. (P. 1061.)

I charge that our Navy is 18,000 enlisted men short of the number of men that they ought to have in peace as a preparation for war, and, in addition to that, there is a shortage of 4,000 more men in sight. That is, there will be an increase required of 4,000 more men to man the vessels coming in commission in 1915 and 1916. (P. 1061.)

In support of my charge I call to witness the evidence of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, and I also cite the evidence of Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger as it appears on page 482 of your hearings. Both of these men say the Navy is 18,000 men short, not counting the sailors needed for the vessels now building. (P. 1061.) (Reference: Hearings; evidence of Admiral Badger and Hon. F. D. Roosevelt, December, 1914.)

The General Board, which actually has made out our war plans, estimates the enlisted forces of the Navy as between 30,000 and 50,000 men short for war. (P. 1061. Reference: Hearings, evidence of Hon. F. D. Roosevelt.)

* * * * *

How about air craft? Other nations have been developing air craft. Before the war broke out France had 1,400 aeroplanes and Germany had 1,000 aeroplanes, with other nations in close pursuit. At that time Servia had three times as many aeroplanes as Uncle Sam (p. 1065). Uncle Sam had 23, while one of the other nations had 1,400; and of the 23 which Uncle Sam had, half of them were in the Army and the other half in the Navy, and they were of the oldest type, and none of them were armored (p. 1065).

* * * * *

Now, how about the dirigibles and Zeppelins? How many of these do you suppose we have? Uncle Sam has not one single, solitary airship of that kind with which to face his enemy. (P. 1065. Reference: Hearings, evidence of Capt. Bristol.) Page 299 of Capt. Bristol's evidence before the committee shows that France has 22 dirigibles and 1,400 aeroplanes; Russia, 18 dirigibles and 800 aeroplanes; Great Britain, 9 dirigibles and 400 aeroplanes; Belgium, 2 dirigibles and 100 aeroplanes; Germany, 40 dirigibles and 1,000 aeroplanes; Austria, 400 aeroplanes and 8 dirigibles; and the United States 23 aeroplanes (p. 1066).

* * * * *

We have, as I said, a dozen aeroplanes in the Navy, and I am informed, or was informed in October last, that only seven of those could get out of their own way (p. 1067). So last year the aeroplane board appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to investigate the whole question recommended an appropriation of \$1,300,000 for that year; and that is as far as they ever got, because, according to the evidence of Capt. Bristol, we let the Aviation Service spend the magnificent sum of \$350,000 last year (p. 1067).

* * * * *

Speaking of the relative standing of the United States Navy—
Let us see how we stood on July 1, 1914, as compared with other nations. On that date the war tonnage of Great Britain was 2,157,000; the war tonnage of Germany was 951,710; the United States had 765,133 tons. (Page 1075. Reference: War Ship Tonnage Bulletin, United States Navy Department, July 1, 1914.)

* * * * *

Now let us see how we would have stood if all the vessels which were building on July 1, 1914, had been complete. This is the total of the war tonnage built and building July 1, 1914: Under those circumstances Great Britain would have 2,700,000 tons; Germany, 1,300,000 tons. Who do you suppose comes third? France would be third with 899,000 tons and the United States fourth with 894,000 tons. (Pages 1075 and 1076. Reference as above.)

Did you know that only 1 submarine out of 12 on the Atlantic coast was in condition to dive when the mobilization was ordered last November? (Reference: Hearings, Commander Stirling's evidence.)

ADMIRAL FISKE'S VIEWS.

[Extracts from testimony by Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, from official printed report of committee.]

I think, of course, it is very well known we are behind other nations—for instance, the two great naval nations in Europe—in the matter of mines and air craft. I think that in case of an attack on our coasts by one of those powers our inadequacy would be very keenly felt. (P. 1007.)

* * * * *

As to scout ships, the policy of the General Board is to cut down what we think we really ought to have, because if we told Congress what we really think we ought to have they would say we are crazy. (P. 1017.)

* * * * *

I would say it would take about five years to get ready with our Navy to fight successfully and effectively against an effective navy. (P. 1023.) I am not thinking so much of the material of the ships as of the operations. What I have in mind all the time is what I would do if we were to have war to-morrow or next month. When I think of the number of things that we would have to do in order to get the Navy into really effective shape—by which I mean having plans, plans of preparation and plans of conduct of the war, and properly drilled mine layers and mine sweepers, and the aeronautical branch—when I think of all that has to be done in preparing general plans and detail plans of war, in getting the personnel enlisted and trained, ready to fight our battleships that are now in reserve and in ordinary, and figure it all out, I conclude that it will take at least five years. (P. 1024.) I doubt if in five years we could get the Navy up to a state of efficiency, for instance, such as that of one of the navies of Europe now. I doubt it very much. (P. 1024.)

* * * * *

We lack a general staff, which shall arrange the plans, that is fundamental; we have not enough personnel to man all the ships. We have not any mining equipment to speak of, or any aeronautical equipment or personnel. Besides the battleships we need small auxiliaries in the fleet, such as have been proposed by the General Board. (P. 1047.)

* * * * *

Mr. GRAY. Has it not been said, Admiral, that to make effective even the ships we have, we need more scout cruisers? I believe you testified to that this morning. I believe, even to make more effective the ships we already have, we need an increase in scout cruisers.

Admiral FISKE. To make the Navy more effective; yes.

Mr. GRAY. And we need more air craft, you say, to make effective the Navy we have now?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mr. GRAY. And we need more submarines, you say, to make effective the ships we now have?

Admiral FISKE. I do not think I said submarines. I said mines.

Mr. GRAY. It also has been said here that we need submarines.

Admiral FISKE. Yes; I agree with that; but I think I spoke of mines.

Mr. GRAY. And we need more destroyers to make more effective the ships we now have. Is not that true?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

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Mr. GRAY. And, also, we require more officers, do we not, to make effective the ships that we now have?

Admiral FISKE. Yes.

Mr. GRAY. And we require more training for those men to make more effective the ships that we now have?

Admiral FISKE. Yes. (P. 1050.)

* * * * *

It would be necessary to supply submarines for only a few individual harbors. That is a small part of the problem. Most all of them should go with the fleet. But in the Canal Zone, which is the most vulnerable part of our entire possessions, anybody can go there and take it that wants to; I think we should have a few submarines. (P. 1053.)

NO DEFINITE POLICY.

[Extract from the Report of the General Board of the Navy, 1913.]

The absence of any definite naval policy on our part, except in the General Board, and the failure of the people, the Congress, and the executive government to recognize the necessity for such a policy has already placed us in a position of inferiority which may lead to war; and this inferiority is progressive and will continue to increase until the necessity for a definite policy is recognized and that policy put into operation.

[Extracts from the Report of the General Board of the Navy, November 17, 1914.]

This shows that we are now deficient 10 battleships, built, building, and authorized, from that contemplated in the 1903 program. (P. 56.)

* * * * *

The General Board believes the policy it has consistently advocated for the production of an adequate Navy is to the best interests of the country, and that any Navy less than adequate is an expense to the Nation without being a protection. (P. 56.)

* * * * *

The General Board in its indorsement No. 449 of August 30, 1913, and accompanying memorandum brought to the attention of the department the dangerous situation of the country in the lack of air craft and air men in both the naval and military services. (P. 58.)

* * * * *

At the present time, more than a year later, the total number of air craft of any kind owned by the Navy consists of 12 aeroplanes, not more than two of which are of the same type, and all reported to have too little speed and carrying capacity for service work. (P. 59.)

* * * * *

In view of the advance that has been made in aeronautics during the past year and the demonstration now being made of the vital importance of a proper service to both land and sea warfare, our present situation can be described as nothing less than deplorable. As now developed air craft are the eyes of both armies and navies, and it is difficult to place any limit to their offensive possibilities. (P. 59.)

* * * * *

In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with any foe possessing a proper air service, our scouting would be blind. (P. 59.)

THE TORPEDO SITUATION.

[Extract from the report of Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, United States Navy.]

The torpedo situation is developing very satisfactorily with the exception of modern torpedoes for battleships anterior to the *Nevada* and *Oklahoma*, for cruisers of the *Tennessee* class, and for the scouts. At present all these vessels are equipped with a short-range torpedo which may be considered obsolete for the battle fleet. (P. 8.)

NOTE.—As neither the *Nevada* nor *Oklahoma* is yet completed, this statement means that every United States battleship afloat is equipped with obsolete torpedoes.—A. P. G.

THE ATLANTIC SUBMARINE FLOTILLA.

[Extract from the evidence of Commander Yates Stirling, jr., December 15, 1914.]

Representative ROBERTS. I am asking you that question because some newspapers state that there is only 1 submarine out of the 17 that will dive.

Commander STIRLING. I think I can explain where they got that impression. The commander in chief ordered a mobilization of the Atlantic submarine flotilla at Hampton Roads on the 1st of November of all available vessels. He left it to me to say what vessels I would bring down there. He did not consider the 5 at Colon. That reduced the submarine flotilla to 12. * * * So when we got down there the admiral wanted to know what we could do. I told him we had then only 1 submarine that I thought could efficiently take part in the maneuvers at sea off the coast. (P. 806.)

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[From bulletins of Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy Department, July 1, 1914.]

VESSELS BUILT.

	Battleships, dread- naught type.	Battle- ships.	Battle cruisers.	Armored cruisers.	Cruisers.	Destroy- ers.	Torpedo boats.	Sub- marines.	Coast- defense vessels.
England.....	20	40	9	34	74	167	49	55	0
Germany.....	13	20	4	9	41	130	0	27	2
United States.....	8	22	0	11	14	31	13	30	4
France.....	4	18	0	20	9	84	135	04	1
Japan.....	2	13	2	13	13	50	27	13	2
Russia.....	0	7	0	6	9	91	14	30	2
Italy.....	3	8	0	9	6	32	68	19	0
Austria-Hungary.....	3	6	0	2	5	18	39	6	6

VESSELS BUILDING OR AUTHORIZED.

	Battle- ships, dread- naught type.	Battle cruisers.	Cruisers.	Destroyers, boats.	Torpedo boats.	Subma- rines.
England.....	16	1	17	21	0	22
Germany.....	7	4	5	24	0	18
United States.....	4	0	0	11	0	19
France.....	8	0	0	3	0	22
Japan.....	4	2	0	2	0	2
Russia.....	7	4	8	44	0	19
Italy.....	7	0	2	15	2	8
Austria-Hungary.....	4	0	5	1	24	6

NOTE.—Attention is invited to following testimony of Assistant Secretary of Navy F. D. Roosevelt (hearings before Committee on Naval Affairs, p. 980, Dec. 16, 1914):

Mr. Roosevelt. I think I can say this: That from confidential reports, the source of which I could not make public, I am led to believe that certain other nations have very greatly increased their submarine strength over the strength as shown in this table.

RELATIVE ORDER OF WARSHIP TONNAGE.

Present order (tonnage completed).		As would be the case if vessels now building were completed.	
Nation.	Tonnage.	Nation.	Tonnage.
Great Britain.....	2,157,850	Great Britain.....	2,714,106
Germany.....	951,713	Germany.....	1,306,577
United States.....	765,133	France.....	899,915
France.....	688,840	United States.....	894,889
Japan.....	519,640	Japan.....	699,916
Italy.....	285,460	Russia.....	672,845
Russia.....	270,861	Italy.....	497,845
Austria-Hungary.....	221,526	Austria-Hungary.....	347,505

ACTIVE PERSONNEL.

England.....	150,609	Germany.....	79,197	United States.....	66,273	France.....	63,846	Japan.....	55,736	Russia.....	52,463	Italy.....	39,913	Austria-Hungary.....	19,531
Total (officers and men).....															

THE ARMY.

[Statement by Congressman GARDNER to House Committee on Military Affairs, January 4, 1915.]

SOLDIERS.

There are 29,405 regular United States soldiers available for a field army, according to Secretary of War Garrison. If all of them were ordered into trenches, they could man a single line about 14 miles long. There are 119,087 militiamen or national guardsmen in the United States, and there are just 16 men in the United States reserve. In other words, until a new army could be organized, drilled, and equipped we have just 148,508 men to summon to take the field. If every one of them answers the summons, they can man a single line of trenches about 65 miles long, just about two-thirds the circumference of Greater New York, by the way.

Our whole field army—militia, regulars, and all—would just about garrison Paris.

But can our militia all be counted on to stem the first onslaught of invasion? Has history shown us any such thing? Is it not a fact that before militia is to be relied upon it must go through an arduous training in a camp of instruction? Will even the best friend of the Militia or National Guard, whichever you call it, claim that it is to-day in a healthy state?

How can anyone make such a claim? The Chief of Staff tells us that in the last year, out of 120,000 militiamen, 23,000 failed to present themselves for the annual inspection, 31,000 absented themselves from the annual encampment, and 44,000 never appeared on the rifle range from one year's end to the other.

ARTILLERY.

The Russian Army in a single battle of the Japanese War had 1,204 field guns engaged. Japan had 922 guns extending over the same front. (Fortifications bill hearing, Dec. 9, 1913.)

We have in our possession only 634 completed modern field guns and howitzers altogether. (Letter from Secretary Garrison to Representative A. P. GARDNER, Dec. 23, 1914.)

That is to say, we own a little over half the guns which Russia had at the battle of Mukden. Yet any ordinary engagement of this European war makes the battle of Mukden look like a peace conference.

Gen. Witherspoon, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, tells us in his recent report that European armies average more than 5 field guns for each 1,000 men. So our 634 guns would only equip a modest little army of 127,000. To be sure, we have appropriated for 226 more guns, but they are not ready.

In the testimony before the Fortifications Committee in 1913 it appeared that Russia has 6,000 field guns, France 4,800, and Germany about 5,000. It will take us quite a while to raise our modest 634 to those figures if the information given us by the War Department is correct. Last session Gen. Wood testified that the entire capacity of this country, working night and day, is 500 guns in a year.

AMMUNITION.

After all, what good would the guns be without ammunition? The Secretary of War expects us to have 580,000 rounds of Artillery ammunition ready by July 1. I hope he is right. It is worth remembering that in a single battle of the Japanese war Russia shot away nearly half that amount. Gen. Wood tells us that 200 rounds of ammunition a day is a fair expenditure for a gun under battle conditions, so you see that our 634 guns can next July be provided with just about four days' ammunition apiece, if Secretary Garrison's hopes are fulfilled.

Last year the Ordnance Department estimated that the Government arsenals, running night and day, with three shifts, can turn out 1,600 rounds of Artillery ammunition daily. In other words, eight field guns can shoot away ammunition just as fast as Uncle Sam can make it. Private manufacturers can not help the situation for three or four months after they get their orders, says Gen. Wood. Listen to this sentence from the general's evidence: "The best estimates indicate that at the end of the first six months not to exceed 350,000 rounds could be procured from all sources, including the Government plant."

Think of that! Three hundred and fifty thousand rounds to be made in half a year. Why, Russia shot away 250,00 rounds in the nine days' battle of Mukden alone.

WHAT THE CHIEF OF STAFF WROTE TO SECRETARY GARRISON.

Seven weeks ago Maj. Gen. Witherspoon, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, wrote to the Secretary of War informing him that for the full equipment of an army of 800,000 men in case of war we are short 400,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition and 11,000,000 rounds of artillery ammunition. Of course, you gentlemen with your ideas will laugh to scorn the idea that we might possibly need 800,000 men in case of war. That is because you will not listen to unpalatable evidence. That is because you shun a real inquiry. Mr. Chairman Hay, I asked you to summon Gen. Witherspoon; I asked you to summon Gen. Wood; and you flatly refused both requests. Yet President Wilson intimates that this committee can be trusted to make an adequate investigation and an adequate report. How have you investigated? What have you done, I should like to know? Why, you summoned Gen. Crozier, who has been Chief of the Ordnance Department for 13 years, and you extracted from him the admission that his own work was most commendable. It is true that you put to him a few questions as to his recommendation for artillery and ammunition, but you didn't put the right questions. You did not drive home the questions which I would have driven home if I had not been muzzled. Why didn't you follow up the question of heavy field guns when you had Gen. Crozier on the stand? Why didn't you ask him to point out why Germany uses 11-inch guns to batter covered trenches if 3-inch guns to scatter shrapnel are all that is needed? You know, Mr. Chairman, that the biggest movable gun in the United States Army is the 6-inch howitzer, and we only have 32 of them completed. Yet the Germans have 16½-inch howitzers and 12½-inch howitzers and 8-inch mortars and the English have 9½-inch howitzers. What big guns the French may have I do not know.

LITTLE AMMUNITION.

[Extract from the report of Brig. Gen. William Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, United States Army, 1914.]

The amount of ammunition on hand for field guns is far short of that considered advisable, although appropriations for this purpose have been materially increased.

No permanent ammunition trains have been provided (p. 22).

WHAT SECRETARY GARRISON SAYS.

[Extracts from the report of Hon. Lindley M. Garrison, Secretary of War, 1914.]

Whatever the future may hold in the way of agreements between nations, followed by actual disarmament thereof, of international courts of arbitration, and other greatly to be desired measures to lessen or prevent conflict between nation and nation, we all know that at

present these conditions are not existing. We can and will eagerly adapt ourselves to each beneficent development along these lines; but to merely enfeeble ourselves in the meantime would, in my view, be unthinkable folly. By neglecting and refusing to provide ourselves with the necessary means of self-protection and self-defense we could not hasten or in any way favorably influence the ultimate results we desire in these respects. (P. 6.)

* * * * *

In continental United States we had in the mobile army on June 30, 1914, 1,495 officers and 29,405 men.

We have a reserve—that is, men who have been trained in the Army and under the terms of their enlistment are subject to be called back to the colors in time of war—consisting of 16 men.

The Organized Militia of the various States totals 8,323 officers and 119,087 men. The enlisted men thereof are required, in order to obtain the financial aid which the Congress authorizes the Secretary of War to extend under certain conditions, to attend 24 drills a year and 5 days annually in the field. If all of the National Guard could be summoned in the event of war, and should all respond (an inconceivable result), and if they were all found fairly efficient in the first line—that is, the troops who would be expected to immediately take the field—we could summon a force in this country of Regulars and National Guard amounting to 9,818 officers and 148,492 men.

And this is absolutely all. The only other recourse would then be volunteers, and to equip, organize, train, and make them ready would take, at the smallest possible estimate, six months.

Anyone who takes the slightest trouble to investigate will find that in modern warfare a prepared enemy would progress so far on the way to success in six months, if his antagonist had to wait six months to meet him, that such unprepared antagonist might as well concede defeat without contest.

* * * * *

For the purpose of information the following table is presented, showing the area, population, and military resources on a peace and war footing of other nations in comparison with ours:

	Land forces of various countries.			
	Area (square miles).	Population.	Peace strength.	Total trained war strength.
Germany.....	208,830	64,903,423	620,000	4,000,000
France.....	207,051	38,961,945	560,000	3,000,000
Russia.....	8,647,657	160,095,200	1,200,000	4,500,000
Great Britain and colonies.....	11,467,294	395,294,752	254,500	¹ 800,000
Italy.....	110,550	32,475,253	275,000	1,200,000
Austria-Hungary.....	261,035	49,418,506	360,000	2,000,000
Japan.....	147,655	53,875,390	230,000	1,200,000
Turkey.....	1,188,874	35,764,876	420,000	1,200,000
Spain.....	194,783	19,503,008	115,000	300,000
Switzerland.....	15,976	3,741,971	140,000	275,000
Sweden.....	172,876	5,476,441	75,000	400,000
Belgium.....	11,373	7,074,910	42,000	180,000
United States (including Philippine Scouts).....	3,026,789	98,781,324	97,760	² 225,170

¹ Excluding native army, 160,000.

² Including Organized Militia and Philippine Scouts.

MAJ. GEN. LEONARD WOOD'S WARNING.

Statement of facts by Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, United States Army, when Chief of Staff. Submitted December 9, 1913; hearings on fortification bill, pages 13, 14, 15, and 16:

I am submitting, for the information of your committee, a statement which shows in detail the condition of the field artillery matériel of the United States Army and the available ammunition for these guns, and I trust that the members of this committee may find time to read this, for it shows that we have neither guns nor ammunition sufficient to give any general commanding an army in the field any assurance of success if attacked by an army of equal size which is supplied with its proper quota of field artillery.

The fire of modern field artillery is so deadly that troops can not advance over terrain swept by these guns without prohibitive losses. It is therefore necessary to neutralize the fire of hostile guns before our troops can advance, and the only way to neutralize the fire of this hostile field artillery is by field artillery guns, for troops armed with the small arms are as effectual against this fire until they arrive at about 2,000 yards from it as though they were armed with knives. This field artillery matériel and ammunition can not be quickly obtained. In fact, the Chief of Ordnance estimates that almost one year would be required to supply the field artillery guns needed with one field army of a little less than 70,000 men. No war within the past 45 years has lasted for one year, so that after war is declared it would probably be over before we could manufacture an appreciable number of guns; and the same applies to ammunition.

The Ordnance Department states that by running night and day with three shifts Frankford Arsenal could turn out about 1,600 rounds of ammunition per day, and that if private manufacturers were given orders to run under war conditions they could begin deliveries of ammunition in from three to four months, and after getting under way could turn out about 100,000 or 200,000 rounds per month for two or three months, and after a total time of six months the production would perhaps equal 250,000 rounds per month. The best estimates indicate that at the end of the first six months not to exceed 350,000 rounds could be procured from all sources, including the Government plant. After this six months there would be no particular difficulty in securing ammunition as rapidly as might be needed.

I will state to the committee that it is my belief that no modern war between first-class powers will last for one year, and unless private manufacturers are now encouraged to manufacture ammunition for our guns after war is declared they will not be in any condition to do so until after the war is finished, and the supply of ammunition during the war will be limited to what the arsenals can turn out. At present this is about 1,600 rounds per day, running three shifts, and this ammunition, under ordinary battle conditions, could be fired by eight guns in one day of battle. If guns are not supplied on the battle field with the ammunition which they can be reasonably expected to use, they are not efficient, and when a gun has exhausted the ammunition supplied it becomes as perfectly useless as junk; in fact, it is worse than junk, for it must be protected by other troops.

In the Russo-Japanese War the Russians expended during the war, exclusive of the action around Port Arthur, 954,000 rounds.

At Mukden in nine days they expended 250,000 rounds.

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One battery of eight guns at Mukden fired 11,159 rounds, or 1,395 rounds per gun.

At Liaoyang eight Russian guns fired in three hours 2,500 rounds, or 312 per gun.

During August 30 and 31 the First and Third Siberians, with 16 batteries of 8 guns each, fired 108,000 rounds, or 844 rounds per gun.

At Schaho, in a four-days fight, the artillery of the First Infantry Division—48 guns—fired 602 rounds per gun.

At this same battle in 45 minutes, 20 minutes of which were not occupied by firing, 42 guns fired 8,000 rounds, or 190 rounds per gun in 25 minutes of actual firing.

The War Department believes, after extended study, that in case of war with a first-class power an army of 500,000 men will be needed to give this country any chance of success against invasion, and that this force will be needed at once. To make it efficient it must be given its proper quota of field artillery. To do this this artillery must be on hand, for it can not be supplied after war is started. A municipality might as well talk about buying its fire hose after the conflagration has started. A fire department without its proper equipment is worthless, irrespective of the number of men it has; and so would your armies, unless you provide in peace the material which will make them effective in war. (Pp. 13, 14, and 15.)

* * * * *

I invite the attention of the committee to the fact that to October 1, 1913, total appropriations have been made by your committee and the Military Committee for only 245,098 rounds of ammunition for our modern field guns. All of this ammunition will not be manufactured until June 30, 1914.

Of this ammunition for modern guns we have at present in this country—with troops, in depots, or under manufacture—186,508 rounds; and for the 2.95 mountain gun 15,106 rounds; a total of 201,614 rounds, and this is all we have.

At Mukden in 9 days the 1,204 Russian guns expended 250,000 rounds.

The present daily output of the ordnance factories is, for three shifts running night and day, not above 1,600 rounds. It is at present manufacturing about 600 rounds of assorted sizes per day with one shift (p. 16).

SHORTAGE OF MUNITIONS OF WAR FOR FIELD ARMY.

(Table prepared from figures given on page 12 of the report of Maj. Gen. W. W. Wotherspoon, Chief of Staff, United States Army, Nov. 15, 1914:)

	Munitions required as a reserve in anticipation of war.	Munitions on hand or in process of manufacture.
Rifles.....	642,541	698,374
Rifle cartridges.....	646,000,000	241,000,000
Field guns (exclusive of giant guns).....	2,834	852
Field-gun ammunition, rounds.....	11,790,850	580,098

AS TO COAST DEFENSES.

[Extract from the report of Brig. Gen. E. M. Weaver, Chief of Coast Artillery, United States Army, 1914.]

From the foregoing it will be seen that the present authorized strength of the regular Coast Artillery Corps is short 564 officers and 10,988 enlisted men of the strength required to man our coast defenses under the adopted policy outlined above.

The defenses outside the continental United States are practically ready for their garrisons, and when these are provided there will remain for home gun defenses 176 officers and 7,543 enlisted men, which is about one-third of one relief.

In order to provide for our primary home defenses, to wit, coast defenses of Portland, Boston, Narragansett Bay, Long Island Sound, eastern New York, southern New York, Chesapeake Bay, Pensacola, San Francisco, and Puget Sound, there are required 662 officers and 16,251 enlisted men.

It will thus be seen that there are now provided about one-fourth of the officers and one-half of the enlisted men necessary for this purpose. Unless provision is made in the near future for additional Coast Artillery personnel, it will be necessary to reduce the garrisons to mere caretaker detachments at some of the defenses of lesser importance, including Portsmouth, Delaware, Charleston, Savannah, Key West, New Bedford, Potomac, Tampa, Columbia, Baltimore, Cape Fear, and Mobile (p. 15).

[Extract from the report of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1914.]

There is a serious deficiency, however, in ammunition for these coast defenses, the supply which the department has been attempting to maintain being on the basis of approximately an hour's full and active operation of the guns in the United States proper and a two hours' full and active operation of the guns in over-sea fortifications. According to the report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, the amount of ammunition now available and provided for by appropriations is equal to about 73 per cent of this requirement for the guns and 50 per cent for the mortars. * * * The deficiencies in the matter of fire control and searchlights are of the most serious character. As a matter of fact, proper fire control and searchlight installation is only maintained in a limited number of first-class defense areas, the remainder of the fire-control systems and searchlight equipment being deficient or improvised (p. 6).

CHESAPEAKE BAY UNFORTIFIED.

[Extract from the report of the National Coast Defense Board, Feb. 1, 1906.]

Commercially and strategically, Chesapeake Bay is to-day, as it always has been, of the very first importance. With the entrance, as it is now, unfortified, a hostile fleet, should it gain control of the sea, can establish, without coming under the fire of a single gun, a base on its shores, pass in and out at pleasure, have access to large quantities of valuable supplies of all kinds, and paralyze the great trunk railway lines crossing the head of the bay. (The situation is the same to-day as nine years ago, when the above was written. The entrance to Chesapeake Bay is still unfortified. A. P. G.)

ENEMY COULD LAND.

[Extract from the evidence of Rear Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, Dec. 9, 1914.]

Representative WITHERSPOON. How many unharbored places are there on the coast where they (the enemy) could land?

Admiral FLETCHER. In smooth water and fine weather, they could land almost any place, as we did from the open sea at Santiago. (P. 536, official printed hearings of House Committee on Naval Affairs.)

THE RANGE OF OUR COAST GUNS.

Correspondence between the Secretary of War and Congressman A. P. GARDNER relative to the comparative range of foreign naval guns and the guns of our seacoast defenses:

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 14, 1914.

The honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Would you be kind enough to answer the following questions:

1. How many 14-inch guns are there in the coast defenses of the United States, and where are they situated?
2. Are there any guns of a larger number of inches in caliber, except the 16-inch gun destined for the Panama Canal?
3. Referring to page 7 of the current report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, how large is the caliber of the guns which "foreign warships of the latest design are carrying"?
4. How much do these foreign guns out-range our 14-inch guns?
5. How much do they out-range our 12-inch guns?

Very respectfully,

DECEMBER 15, 1914.

Hon. A. P. GARDNER,
House of Representatives.

MY DEAR MR. GARDNER: I am in receipt of your letter of even date and answer the inquiries therein as follows:

1. None.
2. No.
3. 15-inch, 45 calibers.
4. The guns just mentioned carry at their maximum elevation 21,000 yards. Our 14-inch guns if mounted so as to shoot at their maximum elevation would carry as far. On the present carriage they would carry 18,000 yards.
5. The foreign guns, just mentioned, as above stated, carry at their maximum elevation 21,000 yards. Our 12-inch guns on their standard carriage carry 13,000 yards. They could be mounted so as to carry a similar distance to the foreign guns just mentioned.

In regard to the question that you put to me orally at your visit yesterday afternoon I repeat the answer which I made to you. In view of the increased size and caliber of guns now on, or contemplated to be placed on, naval vessels and the caliber, mounting, and range of our coast defense guns and the question which has arisen as to their defensive strength against the offensive strength of naval ships with their increased armament I had ordered a board to study this question and report to me thereon.

Sincerely, yours,

LINDLEY M. GARRISON,
Secretary of War.

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REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, November 15, 1914.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report for the period from April 22, 1914, to November 15, 1914:

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY.

According to the latest returns, the actual strength of the Army, exclusive of the Philippine Scouts, is 4,572 officers and 88,444 enlisted men. The authorized strength of the Army is 4,726 officers and 95,977 enlisted men. The Army is therefore 154 officers and 7,533 enlisted men below its authorized strength.

Of the total present enlisted strength of the Army, 22.50 per cent, including recruits and recruiting parties, belongs to the noncombatant and noneffective class, and is not with the colors; 19.45 per cent is in that branch whose special function is coast defense; and 58.05 per cent belongs to the mobile forces (Engineers, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Infantry).

Of the actual strength of the Army from the latest returns, 1,067 officers and 19,899 enlisted men (including recruits and men engaged in recruiting) belong to the staff, technical, and noncombatant branches of the Army.

Seven hundred and forty-six officers and 17,201 enlisted men belong to the Coast Artillery and 2,738 officers and 51,344 enlisted men belong to the mobile army (Engineers, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Infantry).

MOBILE ARMY.

The total strength of the field or mobile forces in our Army is therefore less than 52,000 enlisted men. If from this strength the noncombatants and noneffectives, belonging to the regimental, troop, battery, and company organizations, such as the noncommissioned staff, musicians, cooks, scouts, etc., which aggregate 5,376, are deducted, the actual fighting strength of the Army with the colors, and without deductions for officers and men sick, on furlough, detached service, etc., would be 2,738 officers and 45,968 enlisted men.

There are in the line of the United States Regular Army (including Coast Artillery), not including the two battalions of the Porto Rican Regiment, 65 regimental and 758 troop, battery, and company organizations. Under existing laws there belong to these organizations 322 regimental field officers and 2,358 company officers. Of these officers, according to latest returns, 93 field and 675 company officers are at present absent from their commands on detached service, on leave, or sick. This important branch of the Army is therefore at the present time 28.656 per cent short of the officers who are deemed necessary under existing laws for its instruction, training, and discipline. As the department draws mainly upon the units of the forces in the United States proper for officers for detached service, maintaining as far as possible the full complement of officers with the organizations on foreign service, the percentage of regimental and company officers absent from their organizations is far higher for those organizations in the United States than the above percentage would indicate.

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DISTRIBUTION OF THE MOBILE ARMY.

The enlisted men of the mobile Army are distributed as follows:

In the United States proper.....	30,481
In our foreign possessions.....	20,863
Distributed as follows:	
In the Philippines.....	7,212
In the Hawaiian Islands.....	6,832
In the Panama Canal Zone.....	1,681
In China.....	600
In Alaska.....	431
In Vera Cruz.....	3,434
In Porto Rican Regiment.....	583

Of the enlisted men of the mobile Army in the United States, 18,954 are in the field in Texas and on the Mexican border, 1,665 are in the field in Colorado, 245 are temporarily in Montana, 300 are in Arkansas, and only 9,317 are at their home or permanent stations. It may be added that the department is under the necessity of dispatching in the near future at least one additional regiment of Infantry to Panama, and that this action will still further reduce by at least 1,200 the number of troops of the mobile Army remaining within our continental limits.

MATÉRIEL FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE MOBILE ARMY.

A fairly adequate supply of ammunition and other matériel to maintain the mobile army in the field for a period of six months is now on hand and available.

COAST ARTILLERY CORPS.

As to the Coast Artillery branch of the Army, the strength of that corps must necessarily depend on the number and character of the coast defenses which it is required to man. Its strength has no relation to the strength of the mobile Army other than that the strength of the latter must be adequate to protect the fortified positions from attack from the rear.

Under the present approved policy of the War Department the Coast Artillery defenses in our foreign possessions are to be manned entirely by organizations belonging to the regular service. The Coast Artillery defenses in the United States proper are to be manned at the rate of 50 per cent of the gun and mortar defenses by the Coast Artillery Corps of the Organized Militia.

The strength of the Coast Artillery of the Regular Army, from latest returns, is 746 officers and 17,201 enlisted men. The estimate of the Chief of Coast Artillery shows that 1,312 officers and 30,309 enlisted men of the Regular Army in addition to the 740 officers and 18,531 enlisted men of the Organized Militia required to man 50 per cent of the gun and mortar defenses in the United States are necessary to man the seacoast defenses now existing at home and in our foreign possessions. As the authorized strength of that corps of the Regular Army is 748 officers and 19,919 enlisted men, it is at present 2 officers and 1,818 enlisted men below its authorized strength and 566 officers and 13,108 enlisted men below the necessities as estimated by the Chief of Coast Artillery, in addition to the deficiencies in the Coast Artillery Corps of the Organized Militia. The total deficiencies in the Coast Artillery Corps of the Regular Army and the Organized Militia are, therefore, 856 officers and 24,489 enlisted men.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE COAST ARTILLERY.

The companies of the Coast Artillery Corps are distributed as follows:

	Companies.
On the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts of the United States proper	140
In Texas (equipped and acting as infantry)	5
In our foreign possessions	25
That is:	
In the Philippine Islands	11
In the Hawaiian Islands	8
In the Panama Canal Zone	6

The aggregate enlisted strength of the Coast Artillery Corps required to man the coast defenses in the United States is reported by the Chief of Coast Artillery to be 24,075; the actual number available is 14,633. The aggregate enlisted strength required to man the coast defenses in foreign possessions now completed, or to be completed in the near future, as reported by the Chief of Coast Artillery, is 6,234; the actual number now in those possessions is 2,568. It therefore appears that there is a deficiency of 9,442 enlisted men for the home coast defenses and 3,666 for those in our foreign possessions.

Naval armament in the last few years has rapidly developed, particularly in respect to the caliber of the guns, their ranges, and the rapidity with which fire from these guns can be delivered. At the present time the tendency is to place on the higher type of battleships guns as large as 15 inches in caliber. These guns, whilst carrying a projectile of less weight than those used with our direct-fire type of seacoast guns, have, owing to the greater length of the guns and the higher powder pressures used, a very distinct advantage in range, their range exceeding that of our 14-inch guns from 2,000 to 3,000 yards. Whilst this advantage in range is to a degree offset by the instability of the naval platforms and the less accurate methods of obtaining ranges from ships than from land defenses, there still appears to remain a distinct advantage in this respect, which, coupled with the number of these caliber guns now being carried on the stronger type of naval ships, makes it necessary to give careful consideration to the question whether there should not be a change, not only in the length, caliber, and powder pressures of our heavier type of guns, but whether there should not be a change in the emplacements so as to give overhead protection to the crews operating the guns. In other words, it is my opinion that careful consideration should be given, at least in the establishment of new defense districts, to the question of the caliber, length, and range of the seacoast guns, as well as to the question whether the turret system for the protection of the gun and its crew should not be adopted, in order to put the land defenses somewhat nearer on a parity with the naval guns which are liable to attack them. As a fleet of 8 battleships of the most modern type can throw against a single target 118 projectiles per minute, the danger that must arise from the possibility of fragments of these shells and the debris thrown up from their impact against the concrete parapets which protect the guns, to the crews as well as to the delicate and complicated machinery which operates the guns, would indicate that overhead protection against such fragments should be provided in order to insure the most effective operation of the coast armament.

MATÉRIEL FOR THE COAST ARTILLERY DEFENSES.

Matériel for the coast artillery defenses as at present established and under construction is fairly adequate in the matter of guns, 77415—14417

mortars, and mine matériel. There is a serious deficiency, however, in ammunition for these defenses, the supply which the department has been attempting to maintain being on the basis of approximately an hour's full and active operation of the guns in the United States proper and a two hours' full and active operation of the guns in over-sea fortifications. According to the report of the Chief of Coast Artillery the amount of ammunition now available and provided for by appropriations is equal to about 73 per cent of this requirement for the guns and 50 per cent for the mortars. The amount of explosive necessary to load and operate the mines now provided at our various coast defenses for one charge is complete. The deficiencies in the matter of fire control and searchlights are of the most serious character. As a matter of fact, proper fire control and searchlight installation is only maintained in a limited number of first-class defense areas, the remainder of the fire-control systems and searchlight equipment being deficient or improvised.

ORGANIZED MILITIA.

According to the latest returns, the total reported strength of the Organized Militia is 8,323 officers and 119,087 enlisted men. Of this force, 855 officers and 5,026 enlisted men belong to the staff and non-combatant branches, 450 officers and 7,150 enlisted men belong to the Coast Artillery, and 7,018 officers and 106,911 enlisted men to the mobile forces (Engineers, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Infantry). Of this force there were present at the annual inspection 692 officers and 4,990 enlisted men of the staff corps, 439 officers and 5,989 enlisted men of the Coast Artillery, and 6,553 officers and 85,541 enlisted men of the mobile forces, a total absenteeism from inspection of 639 officers and 23,467 enlisted men. Reports as to the attendance at camps of instruction show that 568 officers and 3,744 enlisted men of the staff corps, 423 officers and 6,135 enlisted men of the Coast Artillery, and 5,904 officers and 77,353 enlisted men of the mobile forces attended these camps of instruction, showing a total absenteeism of 1,428 officers and 31,855 enlisted men from these camps.

As regards practice with the rifle, there were 111,140 officers and men in organizations armed with the rifle. The total number who fired the rifle during the range-practice season, 1913 (the last report available), was 66,974. The total number who fired the rifle during the range-practice season, 1913, and qualified as second-class men or better, was 42,599 officers and men.

From the above figures it will be seen that only 81.07 per cent of the total reported strength of officers and men of the Organized Militia attended the annual inspections; that only 73.87 per cent of officers and men attended the camps of instruction; that the number of men who had any practice with the rifle during the target season 1913 was 52.56 per cent; and that the number who qualified as second-class men or better was 33.43 per cent.

The requirements of the regulations are that units of the Organized Militia shall have at least 24 drills of one hour each per annum. Reports indicate that whilst in a majority of States these requirements were fully met as regards the organizations, yet in a majority of organizations there were a number of enlisted men who failed to attend 24 times for drill and instruction during the calendar year 1913. The total number so failing to attend during the year 1913 was 37,874 men out of a total of 119,087.

There is no indication of the number of practice marches held by the units of the Organized Militia during the year, and it is believed to be

a safe conclusion that not a single unit at its maximum strength marched a distance of 10 miles fully equipped and armed.

The above figures, taken in conjunction with the fact that the number of companies, troops, batteries, etc., is 2,000, and that of this number, 1,120 organizations are below the prescribed minimum strength, would indicate to a degree the dependence to be placed upon this force.

As organized the militia is deficient in the following units to make it a properly balanced and efficient field force:

Cavalry, number of troops-----	54
Field Artillery, number of batteries-----	79
Engineers, number of companies-----	14
Ambulance companies-----	34
Field hospitals-----	12

The deficiency in its Coast Artillery branch is 290 officers and 11,381 enlisted men.

As to the matériel necessary to put this force into the field and maintain it there for a period of six months, there is a very decided deficiency in many important respects. For instance, there are but 550 horses available for the use in drill and instruction of the Cavalry, which aggregates 4,940 officers and enlisted men. The deficiency in horses for the Field Artillery is even greater than that of the Cavalry. There are no animals for the signal or sanitary troops. As regards wagon transportation, the militia as now organized is deficient 1,934 wagons. Should the militia be assembled into divisions and separate brigades, the deficit would be 5,836 wagons. There are no draft animals available. These deficiencies in matériel are very important, inasmuch as they must be supplied before the Organized Militia forces can be made available for field operations.

As regards Field Artillery matériel for the Organized Militia, should this force be called into service with its present number of batteries, the total amount of ammunition necessary therefor would be 1,300,000 rounds of 3-inch ammunition, based on an average of 5,000 rounds per gun, which is equivalent to the best standards of supply of this character of ammunition in foreign armies. To completely equip the proper number of batteries for the 12 militia divisions, including the auxiliary divisions, there would be required, in addition to matériel now in the hands of the Organized Militia, 316 field guns and 1,322,384 rounds of ammunition.

MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

If it is deemed that the condition and strength of our military establishment (including the Organized Militia) as above set forth is satisfactory and adequate to our needs at home and in our foreign possessions under modern conditions and existing circumstances, there appears to be no necessity for special action beyond maintaining that establishment at its present strength and in about its present condition. To make even this force effective, however, by proper training and instruction, a number of additional officers and noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army are urgently needed—first, in order that a full complement of these instructors may be kept with the units of the Regular Army; second, that we may have available an adequate corps of trained instructors for the militia.

In case, however, the strength and condition of that establishment as set forth is deemed inadequate and unsatisfactory, it is pertinent to make suggestions as to what should be done to correct this condition and provide a military establishment adequate to our needs and respon-

sibilities. These suggestions, in my opinion, should be based upon study of conditions as they are in our country and in our foreign possessions, including home needs and the needs which might arise in our relations with other countries.

In looking over the strength of our garrisons in foreign possessions it becomes at once manifest that the garrisons we are maintaining there or propose to maintain there under the scheme of distribution of our Army as it exists at present are entirely inadequate to the needs of those possessions. That an effective defense against an enterprising enemy in the Philippines could be made with a deficiency of 33 per cent of the manning details of the coast defenses of Manila and Subig Bay and with a mobile force of a little over 7,000 American troops, supplemented by less than 6,000 Philippine Scouts, is manifestly impossible; that the great waterway of the Panama Canal can not be protected against the operations of a first-class military power by the present or proposed garrison we contemplate placing there without the power and ability to reenforce it rapidly by troops from the United States is equally manifest; that we can retain our valuable Territory of Alaska in its isolated position against an enemy with any military power by placing there a garrison of less than 500 men verges on the ridiculous unless we have ample forces at home to occupy that Territory in the very earliest stages of an impending conflict. As regards the Hawaiian Islands, all military persons will recognize that the proposed garrison in this possession is far below what it should be to meet a serious attack unless, in this case again, we have an adequate force on the Pacific coast ready to dispatch to the islands when trouble is impending. It must therefore be frankly admitted that the present garrisons of these outlying possessions are entirely inadequate for the purpose for which they have been sent there, and that without a material change in conditions at home we have no available resources from which to reenforce them, even should time be given to us to do so. As the Philippines are too distant from the United States to be reinforced when war is impending, it would seem necessary that the garrison of those islands should be at least a full manning detail for the Coast Artillery defenses and one complete division at full war strength plus the necessary administrative staff. As to our other outlying possessions, it may be said that the garrisons proposed for those possessions, with the exception of Alaska, may be considered adequate only under the contingency that we have available in the United States sufficient thoroughly trained troops in excess of our home needs to warrant us in heavily reinforcing the peace garrisons.

As to the necessities within the continental limits of the United States, whilst our isolation by water from the other great powers is an undoubted protection, that protection is limited by two main factors:

First. The power of our fleet to protect the country from invasion over those seas.

Second. Our ability to assemble rapidly at the points of debarkation selected by an enemy an adequate force to delay, if not prevent, his effecting a lodgment on our shores.

Whether or not our Navy is adequate for the purpose indicated, i. e., to protect our country from over seas, is a question beyond the scope of this report. That we can not, with our present strength, rapidly assemble a sufficient force, fully equipped for field operations, to meet such an expedition as might be dispatched against our shores is evident. The very fact that an enemy traversing the seas would have a wide choice of landing points, or points of attack, at once evidences the difficulties attending the assembly of organizations of

sufficient strength to meet him at the point he may select. It therefore appears to be necessary that the general distribution of forces to meet such a situation would be on a very wide front if prompt opposition to a landing is to be effected.

Fortunately there is no apparent need for garrisons of any great strength on our northern frontier. This, however, is not true as regards our southern frontier, where for the greater part of the last three years we have been compelled gradually to increase the number of troops until at the present time over two-thirds of the mobile forces of our Army in the United States are concentrated.

Careful consideration of our needs would indicate the advisability and necessity for having at all times available at home and, in addition to the necessities in our foreign possessions, in the first line of our military establishment a mobile force of at least 500,000 thoroughly trained and thoroughly equipped fighting men, with adequate supplies for the operation of this force for a period of at least six months. This is a conclusion that seems to have been reached by all those who have given careful consideration to this question. It is also agreed that we should have, as a second line, a thoroughly equipped and trained force of Organized Militia of not less than 300,000 men, properly proportioned as to its staff and several arms, with stores and supplies necessary for its operation in the field for a like period. The smaller units of the standing Army and the corresponding units of the Organized Militia must manifestly be organized into the higher units of brigades and divisions and be susceptible of assembly for drill and field exercises, for without such organization and power of assembly the troops themselves, not to speak of the higher commanders, would be without that experience which is essential to effective operation in war.

As stated elsewhere in this report, the strength of the Coast Artillery Corps bears no relation to the strength of these mobile forces; that corps is charged with the manning and the operation of the seacoast defenses. The mobile Army, on the other hand, must not only be prepared to meet the forces of the enemy after they have effected a lodgment on our coast, but must be prepared, at least in the initial stages of war, to guard all the fortified positions on our coasts from attack from the rear by landing parties from naval vessels and such transports as they may be able to convoy. While the strength of the Coast Artillery Corps therefore depends upon the number of fortified positions it has to operate, the strength of the mobile forces will depend upon the number of fortified positions it must defend from attack from the rear or turning point, plus the necessities which may arise to meet and oppose the landing of an expeditionary force in a region beyond the range of our seacoast guns.

In any scheme to create such a force of mobile troops, as is above contemplated, we can not do better than to follow the example of the master minds in military organization for national defense. The policies developed in this direction all include, amongst others, the primary plan of using the standing Army as a school for the training of men who, on graduation from that school, pass into the reserve and constitute the real national military strength. Experience has shown that from two to three years of active service in the standing Army is the lowest possible limit of time within which the average man can be converted into a disciplined, trained, and effective soldier. After passing through the school and gaining experience, the men under this plan are separated from the active Army and go into the reserve for periods varying from five to a greater number of years, being held at all times, whilst allowed during peace to pursue with the utmost freedom such

civil occupations as they may select, under obligation to respond to a call to the colors in case of national need. This system is economical in the highest degree, as the officers and men receive pay only during their active service, and, on being called to the colors, the period spent in the reserves involving no expense in the way of emoluments.

In arriving at a conclusion as to what the size of the regular mobile army should be, in order that the country may eventually and within a reasonable time have a military establishment adequate to its needs, it is necessary to decide what the size of the Regular, or standing, Army should be in order to provide the 500,000 men believed to be necessary with the colors and in the reserves. Assuming the adoption of a short term of enlistment—say, three years—for the passage of the men thoroughly trained in the school of the Regular, or standing, Army into the reserve, and that men so trained should not be held in the first reserve for a longer period than five years, it would appear that the size of the Regular, or standing, Army to be used as a school for the training of reservists should be about 205,000 enlisted men. If from such an army, organized on a basis of three years' training, we discharge yearly that increment below the grade of sergeant which had completed its three years' training, we would have, with due allowance for deaths, etc., in the first year of its complete operation an army of 263,700 (205,000 plus 58,700 reserves); in the second year an army of 322,400 (205,000 plus 117,400 reserves); in the third year an army of 381,100 (205,000 plus 176,100 reserves); in the fourth year an army of 439,800 (205,000 plus 234,800 reserves); in the fifth year an army of 498,500 (205,000 plus 293,500 reserves). After this the Army would be maintained at the last figure, and in addition we would be accumulating trained men in the second reserve at the rate of about 55,000 each year.

The rule as to the accumulation of reserves for the operation of the Coast Artillery Corps does not seem to have the same force as when that principle is applied to the mobile army, inasmuch as it is necessary for the Coast Artillery at all times to man their defenses with practically the full complement, and that corps, as it is not charged with any greater requirements as to strength in war than in peace, does not require expansion in war. However, the principle applies to a degree, at least, to this corps in order that its ranks may at all times be readily filled with experienced men when war is imminent.

Whether our country could adopt the principle of creating a reserve without compensation to the reservists whilst not actively serving with the colors is doubtful, but it would seem that a small remuneration might be given for the retention of their services.

No reason is seen why the same principle as to reserves should not be applied to the Organized Militia, and the men trained in its units be bound for service for a period corresponding to that of the reservists for the Regular Army. It must, however, be admitted that unless there be a material change in the laws governing the Organized Militia which will bring about a greater reliance upon and an increased control by the General Government, that branch of our military establishment can not be regarded and depended upon as a reliable force. Such a modification in the law to meet this end might be brought about by placing the Organized Militia under pay by the General Government and, under a binding obligation, to serve at its call. This, it is thought, would produce a state of affairs where the Organized Militia will be much more thoroughly trained than it possibly can be under existing laws, and to that extent can be more surely depended upon. In any regulations or modifications of law looking to the better organization of the militia as a national force it naturally

follows that the United States should have the power to create in the Organized Militia that parity of the several arms of the service and staff which is essential for effective operations in war. It should also have the power to detach from the Regular Army such numbers of officers and noncommissioned officers as it may find necessary to place on duty with the Organized Militia to aid and assist the officers of that branch of the national defense in a thorough training of the units.

The question of supplies and equipment necessary to make such forces as we may organize effective is of primary importance. No matter what size force we may have, it will be ineffective without proper and adequate supplies and equipment. It would therefore appear that we should establish depots in which should be deposited all those supplies necessary to the effective operation of our Army which can not be readily and rapidly procured in the first stages of war.

OUR SUPPLY OF MUNITIONS MOST NECESSARY IN WAR.

No attempt will be made to enter into particulars as to the character of supplies that it will be necessary to accumulate and store for the use of such forces as are contemplated in the above scheme; that is, a regular mobile army, including its reserves of 500,000 men, and a force of 300,000 mobile Organized Militia troops, including its reserves. One illustration will be sufficient, and that will be taken from the munitions most necessary in war, as rifles and field artillery. The proper proportion of rifles in a force of this character, including the Cavalry, which is armed with the rifle, would be 642,541. The minimum accumulated supply of rifle ammunition, based on 1,000 rounds per rifle, should be 646,000,000 rounds. The proper proportion of field and heavy guns of the mobile type, and exclusive of the gigantic engines of war of more recent introduction, drawn by tractors, no types of which have as yet been developed in this country, would be 2,834. The ammunition for this type of guns, based upon a supply of 5,000 rounds per light field gun, with a corresponding proportion for the heavier field guns, a conservative estimate, if we regard the examples of the great military nations, would be 11,790,850 rounds. It is sufficient to point out that at the present time we have on hand and being manufactured 698,374 United States rifles (model 1903) and 241,000,000 rounds of ammunition for these rifles, 852 field guns and 580,098 rounds of ammunition for these guns. The number of guns per thousand men used in the calculation as to the total number required in the above estimate as to force is five, that number being considerably below the average in European armies. It should also be remembered that large numbers of guns and large masses of ammunition are, in an active war, liable to capture and destruction, and that to start into field operations with the expectation that the proportions given will be maintained without large sources of manufacture, would be fallacious. As the factories and works in this country which can produce munitions of war of the above character are exceedingly limited, it is evident that a full supply of this type of matériel must be stored and ready for use before war is undertaken.

DEPOTS.

As regards the depots in which supplies for the military establishment should be stored, their distribution should be in the immediate vicinity of the troops, both of the Regular Army and the Organized Militia, which are to be equipped from them. The distances in this great country between the present limited number of depots and the stations of the troops or the areas from which the troops will mainly be drawn, are so great that an effective distribution from them to troops

organized under the general scheme here contemplated would be ineffective in that it would consume a great amount of the limited time which modern warfare indicates would be at the disposal of a country subject to attack whose plans contemplate the mobilization of its forces only after war is imminent or has been declared.

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY.

On the 22d of April, 1914, the naval forces occupied the city of Vera Cruz, Mexico. In accordance with the directions of the President, so much of the Fifth Brigade of the Second Division, with certain auxiliary troops, as could be accommodated on the transports at that time available, were ordered dispatched from Galveston, Tex., to Vera Cruz. Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston, with 225 officers and 3,832 enlisted men and a limited amount of transportation, sailed with the major portion of his reenforced brigade from Galveston on the 24th of April and arrived at Vera Cruz on the 28th of April. At noon on the 30th of April, Gen. Funston took over the command of the city of Vera Cruz from the naval authorities, and with his force of 3,832 enlisted men of the Army and 3,333 enlisted men of the United States Marine Corps, ordered to report to him for duty, making a total enlisted force of 7,165 men, occupied the immediate suburbs of the city, and extended his lines to include El Tejar, about 9 miles distant, where the main source of fresh water supply for the city is located. A large proportion of the reenforced brigade was necessarily left in Galveston on April 24, due to the lack of water transportation facilities. Owing to changed conditions subsequent to the occupation of the city of Vera Cruz by our forces, the original strength of Gen. Funston's command which landed at Vera Cruz has not been augmented, and certain elements of the brigade which properly belong to it, such as parts of its Field Artillery, Cavalry, and transportation, have been retained ever since at Galveston. The latest reports indicate that the enlisted forces of his command have now shrunk to about 3,434 men of the Army and 2,500 men of the Marine Corps, an aggregate enlisted strength of 5,934, this shrinkage arising mainly, so far as the Army is concerned, from the discharge of time-expired men and sickness.

The health of the command during the time it has been in Vera Cruz has, owing to the unremitting attention given to sanitation, been remarkably good, the sick rate steadily decreasing until, as indicated by the last reports, it was between 1.35 and 1.93 per cent.

It is due to this command to call particular attention to its having been able to avoid friction with the foreign elements of the population and the armed forces which have at all times confronted it. The situation was a delicate one and called for the greatest tact on the part of both officers and men. No instances have been brought to the attention of the department of any serious friction between the troops and the inhabitants of Vera Cruz or with the armed bodies of Mexicans outside the city.

The 1,703 miles of Mexican border from Brownsville, Tex., to the vicinity of San Diego, Cal., was, on the 22d of April, kept under observation and patrolled to the extent possible by 359 officers and 8,260 enlisted men under the command of Brig. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, who, as commanding general of the Southern Department, controls the border from the mouth of the Rio Grande to the Colorado River, and Maj. Gen. Arthur Murray, who, as commanding general of the Western Department, controls the border from the Colorado River to the Pacific coast.

When the news of the occupation of the city of Vera Cruz by United States forces reached the border a marked increase of the feeling of uneasiness and apprehension became manifest, both on the Mexican and on our side. Conditions there became such that it was deemed advisable to make a material increase of the forces at the disposal of the commanding general of the Southern Department, and to that end the Eighth Brigade from the Western Department, the Second Brigade from the Eastern Department, the Sixth Field Artillery from the Central Department, and five companies of the Coast Artillery Corps from the coast-defense district of the Gulf, aggregating 193 officers and 5,545 enlisted men, were ordered to report to the commanding general of the Southern Department for assignment to station, and were by him distributed along the border. This movement, together with the changes made in the Western Department, brought the strength of the Regular Army forces on the border and in Texas up to over 20,000 men. The duties performed by these troops have been of a very arduous and exacting character. Living for the most part under canvas or improvised shelter, they have had the task of patrolling and guarding the very long line, much of which is desert, all of it exceedingly hot. They have been called upon to prevent not only the incursion of hostile parties into our own territory, but to receive and disarm considerable numbers of Mexican troops driven into our territory by stress of war. A good part of the time has been spent by the troops in efforts to prevent the passage of munitions of war from entering into Mexican territory. Whilst it was impossible under conditions to accomplish fully the task of preventing the passage of these munitions across the border, great success has attended the efforts to stop the incursion of armed parties and to disarm Mexican troops driven into our territory. First and last, over 5,000 Mexicans driven into our territory were disarmed and held as prisoners until very recently, when they were released, and the enlisted men amongst them returned to their own country. The total approximate cost attending the care and maintenance of these prisoners was over \$719,883. The skill and forbearance shown by the officers and men in this arduous frontier service warrants the highest commendation, particularly in view of the fact that in their operations 1 of our men has been killed and 9 wounded by bullets fired from the Mexican side of the border; in addition, a number—about 20—of our citizens have been killed and wounded in like manner. Conditions on the frontier continue to be such as to give little hope of relief coming in the near future to these troops, many of whom have been absent from their permanent stations, living in tents, for over two years.

Late in the month of April, 1914, a situation arose in the coal regions of Colorado which necessitated the dispatch of United States troops to that region. The Eleventh Cavalry, from Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., the second squadron of the Fifth Cavalry, from Fort Leavenworth, and seven troops of the Twelfth Cavalry, from the Central Department, were sent, and have been on duty there ever since. Good order has been preserved by the troops since they have been there, and no overt acts of a serious character have been committed in the regions under their control.

Early in the month of September conditions in Butte, Mont., were of such a character as to render it necessary for the governor to dispatch the militia of that State to the Butte region, and, incident to this state of affairs, a battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry was moved from Fort Wright, Wash., to Fort William Henry Harrison, Mont. Recently it was found necessary to transfer this battalion to Fort Missoula, where it is now temporarily stationed.

Early in November conditions in the coal regions of Arkansas developed to a state where it was deemed necessary to dispatch troops to that region in support of the United States courts. The first squadron of the Fifth Cavalry was ordered to proceed to Fort Smith, Ark., for duty. These troops are still on duty in the State of Arkansas.


Owing to the pressing necessity for troops for more important duties and with a view to their being better prepared for the purpose for which troops are maintained, early in the year orders were issued relieving the troops to a great extent from the guarding of the national parks, and leaving these parks under the control of the Interior Department. To this end, the troops dispatched to the Yosemite National Park, Cal., were withdrawn; the usual orders for the guards to proceed to the Sequoia and Grant Parks were not issued, and the second squadron of the First Cavalry, with its machine-gun platoon, was relieved from duty in the Yellowstone Park and ordered to join its regiment in California, a military guard consisting of a detachment of about 200 mounted men drawn generally from the Cavalry of the Army being left at the Yellowstone Park to perform the duties heretofore performed by the troops relieved.

Very respectfully,

W. W. WOTHERSPOON,
Major General, Chief of Staff.

The SECRETARY OF WAR.
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